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ABSTRACT 
 
     When the market undergoes a learning process about the IPO, it takes time for the demand 
to reach the equilibrium consistent with the new issue’s intrinsic value. Hence, the temporary 
short-term demand can deviate substantially from the stabilized long-term demand. This 
difference requires the underwriter to respond differently to different pre-market conditions 
that are dictated by the short-term demand: While she must accommodate the overly 
pessimistic views of investors in a cold IPO (because the shares cannot be sold at a perceived 
premium), she has the option to respond only partially to investors’ overly optimistic views in 
a hot IPO. We model this asymmetric response of the underwriter and derive IPO regularities 
relating underpricing, partial price revision, and long-run underperformance. We provide 
evidence that supports the model’s predictions.  
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When the intrinsic value of an initial public offering (IPO) is initially unknown, the market 
inevitably undergoes a learning process in early aftermarket trading. As a result of market 
learning, the short-term demand that applies to both the pre-market and the early aftermarket 
can deviate greatly from the stabilized long-term demand. In this paper, we model IPO pricing 
in such a setting, where the demand for the new issue is initially biased (i.e., it is initially too 
high or too low) and it approaches the long-term or sustainable demand gradually as 
aftermarket trading progresses. 
The difference between the short-term demand and the expected long-term demand requires 
the underwriter to respond differently to different pre-market conditions: While she must 
accommodate the overly pessimistic views of investors in a cold IPO (because the shares 
cannot be sold at a perceived premium), she has the option to respond only partially to 
investors’ overly optimistic views in a hot IPO (for the shares can be placed at a perceived 
discount). We model this asymmetric response of the underwriter in IPO pricing. We make two 
key assumptions: (i) The demand for the new shares is initially biased in the sense that it is too 
high or too low relative to the long-term demand, and (ii) the underwriter’s learning on market 
demand follows the Bayes’ rule. With these two assumptions, we characterize the decision of 
the underwriter, who face rational yet uninformed investors in the new issue, and derive IPO 
regularities relating underpricing, partial price revision, and long-run underperformance.  
Our results are asymmetric between hot and cold IPOs. We define an IPO as hot (cold) if 
the short-term demand for the new issue is stronger (weaker) than the expected long-term 
demand. The IPO starts with a preliminary offer price proposed by the underwriter based on her 
initial belief. Through book building, the underwriter learns about the current-market demand 
and then updates her belief as a Bayesian learner. For a hot IPO, the underwriter revises the 
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pre-market demand upwards and accordingly adjusts the offer price from the preliminary price 
to the expected intrinsic value. Under the Bayes’ rule, the price adjustment must be insufficient 
to absorb the abnormally-strong temporary demand, thus leaving the first-day price to go up 
beyond the offer price. Therefore, hot IPOs in our model are associated with a positive price 
update, a positive first-day return, and a positive relation between the two. On the other hand, 
in a cold IPO, the sales constraint forces the underwriter to fully adjust the price downwards to 
meet the abnormally-low temporary demand. As a result, cold IPOs are associated with a 
negative price update, zero initial return, and non-meaningful link between the two. 
Although many of these results are also derived, one way or the other, by previous IPO-
pricing models, our model is different in significant manners. First, the information setting and 
thus the initial-return mechanism are different. In our model, because the new issue’s intrinsic 
value is initially inherently unknown and it takes time to show up, all IPO participants in our 
model are initially equally uninformed. Hence, the various asymmetric-information-based 
mechanisms such as adverse selection (Rock, 1986), signaling (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber, 
1988), information revelation (e.g., Benveniste and Splidt, 1989), and strategic pricing 
(Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack, 2002) do not apply with our model. Indeed, the first-day 
return in our model is not a discount on the stock’s fundamental value, but a hot-market effect 
due to a lack of market learning. Unlike the investor-sentiment argument that attributes this 
effect to investors’ irrational behavior (Derrien, 2005), we justify it by the nature of market 
learning: it takes time for the market to converge to the new issue’s intrinsic value and thus the 
sustainable demand. 
Second, we model the underwriter as a Bayesian learner, who, in a decision under 
uncertainty, finalizes the offer price by using the book-building information in a standard 
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Bayesian-updating process. Previous models do not describe this price-revision mechanism. On 
the one hand, underwriter learning is trivial in previous book-building models, where the 
uninformed underwriter becomes fully informed immediately after the book-building process. 
On the other hand, underwriter learning does not occur in various models without book 
building. Our assumption of the uncertainty in short-term market demand requires the 
underwriter to be a Bayesian learner. 
Third and more important, our model has further predictions for decomposed IPO initial 
returns that clearly distinguish our model from previous models. We decompose an initial 
return into a “demand-uncertainty component” and a “fundamental-discount component.” The 
former is the first-trading day closing price over the expected intrinsic value, which measures 
the deviation of the initial aftermarket price from the fair value. The latter is the expected 
intrinsic value over the offer price, which presents “true” underpricing (and which is apparently 
different from the total initial return). This latter component is the main concern of previous 
models.1 We derive explicit and testable predictions for these two components and their 
relations with the price update, distinguishing between hot and cold IPOs. While these 
predictions cannot be obtained from any models without book building, they are mostly 
inconsistent with prior book-building models.  
In the second part of this paper, we perform empirical tests for the initial-return components 
using a sample of US IPOs. To decompose an initial return, we follow Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan (2004) and estimate the new issue’s intrinsic value using price multiples of 
industry peers. With IPO valuations based on three price multiples (which are price-to-
EBITDA, price-to-sale ratio, and price-to-earnings), we obtain empirical results that are highly 
                                                          
1 The investor-sentiment models of IPO pricing such as Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh 
(2006) involve both components. 
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consistent with our model’s predictions. Our major findings include the following: First, for hot 
IPOs, initial returns come exclusively from the demand-uncertainty component and this 
component is positively associated with the price update. In other words, there is no 
underpricing in a hot IPO and the positive initial return and its positive relation with price 
revision are purely a demand-uncertainty phenomenon. Second, for cold IPOs, the two 
components are perfectly offsetting and, consequently, there is zero initial return. More 
specifically, in a cold IPO, the demand-uncertainty component is negative but is positively 
associated with the price update, while the fundamental-discount component is positive but is 
negatively associated with the price update. Underpricing as a discount on the fundamental 
value occurs in our model only with cold IPOs, which is a forced result due to the excessively 
low short-term demand.  
As an alternative approach, we also decompose IPO initial return using a secondary-market 
price as the proxy for the new issue’s fair value. When the secondary-market price is 
sufficiently stabilized (which, in our sample, occurs about one year after the IPO), the results 
from this alternative approach are also consistent with our model’s predictions.     
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I briefly discusses the literature of IPO 
underpricing. Section II describes our theoretical model. Section III presents our test of the 
model’s predictions. Section IV concludes the paper. 
I.  Literature 
Among the various theories in finance that model IPO underpricing, most prominent are 
those based on asymmetric information. Rock (1986) presents an adverse-selection model of 
IPO pricing in which information is asymmetric between investors. In Rock, underpricing is a 
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mechanism that helps the uninformed rational investors breakeven who would otherwise not 
participate in the IPO. Allen and Faulhaber (1988),  Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch 
(1989) address asymmetric information between issuers and investors. They argue that when 
issuers are better informed than investors about the firm’s future prospects, high-quality issuers 
have an incentive to signal by underpricing the new issue. Benveniste and Splidt (1989) and 
Shermand and Titman (2002) model the IPO as a book-building process in which the 
underwriter collects private information from informed investors. The new issue is on average 
sold at a discount to compensate the investors for disclosing costly private information.2 By 
focusing on investor sentiment, Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) 
emphasize the role of investor sentiment in IPO pricing and argue that underpricing is used as 
compensation to regular investors either for providing information or for bearing sentiment 
induced risk. …  While asymmetric-information models are theoretically appealing, they have 
difficult in explaining the great variation of IPO initial returns. 3  
Assuming away asymmetric information, other theories are also proposed to explain IPO 
underpricing. Tinic (1988) and Hughes and Thakor (1992) contend that new issues are 
underpriced because the issuers and investment banks want to avoid the legal risk. Rydqvist 
(1997) highlights the tax advantage of IPO underpricing to issuers as well as underwriters. 
Chemmanur (1993) and Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) argue that the issuer 
                                                          
2 In support of this theory, Hanley (1993) provides evidence showing that underwriters do not fully adjust the 
offer price upwards when the demand is strong. Because underwriters only partially incorporate the positive 
information obtained during the book-building process in the finalized offer price, such investors are compensated 
by receiving more underpriced shares. However, Ince (2008) shows that this phenomenon is better explained by 
the bargaining hypothesis of IPO offer price adjustment as hypothesized by Loughran and Ritter (2002).  
3 Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010) report that IPO initial returns display extremely high volatility. For IPOs 
conducted between 1965 and 2005, while underpricing averages 22%, only five percent of the initial returns are 
between 20% and 25% and nearly one-third of them are zero or negative. This finding poses a challenge to IPO 
underpricing theories. In particular, the large fraction of overpriced IPOs and severely underpriced IPOs are 
difficult to explain with arguments of asymmetric information. 
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strategically underprices the issue in order to generate information momentum by attracting 
more analyst research activities and media coverage, which helps push up the demand and 
benefits the owners to sell the shares after the lockup period expires. Hao (2007) models the 
effect of laddering on IPO pricing. She shows that with laddering, in which the underwriter 
requires the ladderer to buy additional shares of the issuer in the aftermarket as a condition for 
receiving shares at the offer price, the expected underpricing is greater. 
II.  Theory 
A.  Information setting 
We consider the underwriter and the investors in an IPO. The underwriter represents the 
issuer and takes the firm public. The investors are assumed to be either short-term or long-term 
oriented. Short-term investors are concerned with the initial return and wish to sell the shares in 
the immediate aftermarket. On the other hand, long-term investors have an incentive to hold the 
shares for the long run so they look forward to the expected long-term return. The investors are 
heterogeneous and, based on their individual beliefs, decide whether or not to purchase the 
shares in the IPO. The new stock’s intrinsic value is unknown to the investors and the 
underwriter, but is gradually revealed in aftermarket trading. Therefore, with no market-
equilibrium history, the market takes time to approaches the “fundamental” demand for the new 
stock that is consistent with the stock’s intrinsic value. In other words, in the early aftermarket, 
the demand is subject to a new-stock volatility, in addition to that associated with the stock’s 
fundamental risk, that diminishes over time.  
We consider the new issue pricing as a two-stage process: preliminary pricing and price 
finalization. In the first stage, the underwriter determines a preliminary offer price, 1−P , from 
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which investors are invited to submit their intended bids. These bids are informative of the 
market demand for the new stock and thus the stock’s intrinsic value, V. We refer to this stage 
as the pre-market period in which book building takes place, which, in the U.S., is known as the 
registration period. In the second stage, the issuer determines the final offer price, 0P , and 
allocates the shares to investors based on the distribution of shares demanded at this price. This 
stage refers to the short period after the book-building process is completed and before 
aftermarket trading starts. After the stock begins to trade, the first-day closing price, 1P , and the 
initial return in dollar terms, 01 PPR −= , are realized.  
In this study, our main concern is the effect of the demand uncertainty in the pre-market 
and early aftermarket on the pricing of the IPO. We do not model the potential role of the 
preliminary offer price. In this study, the determination of the preliminary price is trivial: it is 
chosen based on the underwriter’s prior belief and it does not affect, in any way, the efficiency 
of information acquisition. After the book-building process, the underwriter updates her belief 
on the market demand and then adjusts the offer price. The final offer price simultaneously 
determines the price revision and, given the immediate aftermarket demand, the initial return. 
B. IPO Pricing under Demand Uncertainty 
The demand curve is a decreasing function of the share price, P ,4   
     ( ) bPaPQ −= ~ ,     (1) 
where the first term, a~ , is random, which equals H or L , where LH > . Unlike the 
conventional secondary market volatility associated with the stock’s fundamental risk, the 
uncertainty in a~ is new-stock specific, which occurs because the market experiences a learning 
                                                          
4 See Hao (2007) and Aggarwal, Krigman, and Womack (2002) for downward sloping demand curves. 
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process before converging to the sustainable level of demand for the new stock. Therefore, as 
aftermarket trading progresses, the uncertainty diminishes and a~ gradually approaches to the 
fundamental level, H or L , that is determined by the stock’s intrinsic value. For simplicity, the 
slope, b, is assumed to be constant and known to the underwriter.5  
At the time when the IPO is filed with SEC, the underwriter has a prior probability of one 
half for the high or low level of the demand, and hence the expected value of a~  is ( ) 2LH + . 
Because the decision on 1−P  will have no effect on the information obtained from the book-
building process, the underwriter’s decision at this stage is to choose a preliminary price 1−P  
based on her prior belief alone, regardless of what might happen to the final offer price. 
Suppose the total number of shares is 1−N , so the total capital to be raised from the IPO is 
11 −− NP . By abstracting from issues about liquidity and control, we ignore the difference 
between the shares being retained and those being placed. Then the underwriter’s problem is: 
11, 11
−−
−−
PNMax
NP
    s.t.    ( )
b
NLHP 11
2 −
−
−+≤ .   (2) 
The valuation constraint rules out intended overpricing. The solution for the preliminary price 
is:  
    
b
LHP
41
+=− .     (3) 
Because 1−P  will have no effect on the efficiency of the book-building process and hence on 
the determination of the final offer price, this solution gives an uninformative preliminary price 
that fulfills the regulatory filing requirement. 
                                                          
5 b can also to be random. However, this variation will have no added value but make the solution more complex. 
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After book building, the underwriter observes the pre-market demand, PMa , which equals 
H or L . Because the short-term demand will remain uncertain in the early aftermarket, this 
observed demand is still to converge to the stabilized level in the longer run, *a , which is also 
H or L . After having gathered information from the book-building process, the underwriter 
becomes better informed of the market demand. Therefore, in the second stage, the underwriter 
updates her belief and finalizes the offer price. To model the underwriter’s learning, we assume 
that the pre-market demand is a random realization of the new issue’s intrinsic value as the 
following: 
    ⎩⎨
⎧
−= .1y probabilitwith 
,y probabilitwith 
qL
qH
aPM    (4) 
where the probability q  is a function of the unobserved sustainable demand *a . It equals Hδ  if 
Ha =* , and Lδ  if La =* , where LH δδ > . The underwriter learns about Hδ and Lδ from the 
book-building information. With (4), we have implicitly assumed that the pre-market demand is 
either too high (because when HaPM = , there is a chance for La =* ) or too low (because 
when LaPM = , there is a chance for Ha =* ). Although we can easily add one scenario for 
unbiased pre-market demand, it will add no value to our model except that the solution will 
become more complex and less convenient to interpret.  
After observing PMa , the underwriter updates her belief following the Bayes’ rule and 
obtain the following posterior probabilities: 
     ( ) LH HPM HaHa δδ δδ +=== |* ,       ( ) LH
H
PM LaHa δδ
δδ −−
−===
2
1|* .  (5) 
Apparently, ( )
2
1>= HaH PMδ  and ( ) 21<= LaH PMδ , which means that the book-building 
 10
process is informative. The Bayesian updating of the underwriter’s belief is an important 
feature of our model. Before the book-building process, the underwriter is equally uninformed 
as investors. After the updating, she becomes partially informed although uncertainty in the 
demand still remains. 
The underwriter’s problem in the second stage is to choose 0P  and 0N to maximize total 
capital, 00 PN . There are now two constraints that the underwriter needs to consider. The first 
constraint requires the number of total shares to be sold be subject to the pre-market demand. 
This is a sales constraint imposed by the pre-market condition. The number of shares that can 
be placed is confined to the demand at the time when the shares are priced and allocated, and 
this demand deviates from that of both short-term and long-term investors. The sales constraint 
requires ( )00 PQN ≤ . That is, 
       00 bPaN PM −≤ .     (6) 
The second constraint is to rule out intentional overpricing. This valuation constraint 
requires ( )*0 PEP ≤ . That is, 
      
( ) ( )[ ]
.
1 0
0 b
NaHLaHH
P PMPM
−−+≤ δδ    (7) 
Because this constraint derives from the posterior probabilities instead of from the priors, the 
investors in the pre-market are willing to pay a price that is either higher or lower than one 
satisfying (7). We view (7) as the long-term demand constraint that is dictated by the 
participation of long-term investors. With this constraint, we assume away the possibility that 
the underwriter purposely overprices the new issue thus allowing informed investors to make 
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short-term profits at a cost to uninformed ones (see, e.g., Derrien, 2005).6  
The underwriter maximizes the total capital raised from the offering subject to the sales and 
valuation constraints, (6) and (7). The sales constraint assures the participation of short-term 
investors and the valuation constraint assures the participation of long-term investors. When 
early-market liquidity and underwriter reputation are important, it is necessary for the new 
issue to be attractive to both short-term and long-term investors.  
We obtain the solution for the final offer price as a function of the pre-market demand as 
follows (see Appendix A for the proof):  
      ( ) ( )
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
=
=+
+
=
. If
2
, If
2
0
La
b
a
Ha
b
LH
aP
PM
L
PMLH
LH
PM
δδ
δδ
   (8) 
We note three points about this solution. First and as expected, ( ) ( )LaPHaP PMPM =>= 00 . 
That is, the price of a “hot” IPO (in which the investors are overly optimistic) is higher than 
that of a “cold” IPO (in which the investors are overly pessimistic). Second, with the hot-IPO 
solution, ( )HaP PM =0 , the valuation constraint is binding while the sales constraint is 
unbinding. This result comes directly from the assumption that the underwriter avoids new 
issue overpricing. So when investors in the IPO are overly optimistic, the underwriter 
disregards the high market sentiment and prices the IPO at its expected intrinsic value. Third, 
on the other hand, with the cold-IPO solution, ( )LaP PM =0 , the sales constraint is binding 
while the valuation constraint is unbinding. 
                                                          
6 An alternative approach to the specification of the valuation constraint is to use a weight average demand that 
takes into account both the uncertain current demand and the expected long-term demand, where the weight 
reflects the  trade-off in the underwriter’s pricing strategy between the current-deal success and her long-term 
reputation. 
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In the solution, short-term investors earn an abnormal return in a hot IPO and zero return in 
a cold IPO, while long-term investors earn a market return in a hot IPO and an abnormal return 
in a cold IPO. On average, IPO investors, who purchase the shares in the pre-market, earn an 
abnormal return. The cost, however, is born by a different party; secondary-market investors, 
who purchase the shares in the aftermarket, bear the cost in a hot IPO while the issuer bears the 
cost in a cold IPO. Such wealth transfer occurs as a consequence of market learning. 
To obtain the first-day return, we need to determine the immediate aftermarket price, 1P . 
Because in aftermarket trading, the price is pushed up to the demand curve, the price adjusts so 
that the condition 10 bPaN PM −=  is satisfied. We therefore have: 
   ( )
b
NaNaP PMPM 001 ,
−= .    (9) 
Combing Eqs. (3), (8) and (9), we obtain the price update and initial return as a function of 
the pre-market demand as follows:  
Proposition 1:  The IPO’s price update, initial return, and their relationship are as follows: 
(i) Price update:    
( )
( )
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
=−−
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−
=− −
. If
4
, If
4
10
La
b
LH
Ha
b
LH
PP
PM
PMLH
LH
δδ
δδ
    (10) 
(ii) Initial return:    
( )( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
=+
−
=−
. If0
, If
01
La
Ha
b
LH
PP
PM
PMLH
L
δδ
δ
     (11) 
(iii) Initial return and price update:   ( )( )
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=
=−−=− −
. If0
, If4 10
01
La
HaPP
PP
PM
PMLH
L
δδ
δ
 (12) 
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All three results are asymmetric between hot IPOs and cold IPOs. For hot IPOs, the demand 
in the pre-market and immediate aftermarket is higher than the expected long-term demand, but 
the price is only adjusted up to the expected intrinsic value that is consistent with the long-term 
demand. Therefore, the offer price is updated upwards but only partially,7 and the initial return, 
which comes from the excessively high short-term demand, is positive and changes with the 
price update. On the other hand, for cold IPOs, because the price is forced down to meet the 
excessively low demand, the price is adjusted downwards and fully and, as a result of full 
adjustment, there is zero initial return. 
A restatement of these results gives the following testable predictions: 
Prediction 1.  The offer price is updated upwards and partially for hot IPOs, and is updated 
downwards and fully for cold IPOs.  
Prediction 2.  Hot IPOs earn positive initial returns, while cold IPOs earn zero initial return.  
Prediction 3.  For hot IPOs, there is a positive association between the initial return and the 
price update. This association does not occur with cold IPOs.  
These predictions cannot be derived from models without book building, because without 
the book-building mechanism such models have no implication for price revision and do not 
distinguish between hot and cold IPOs. Most of these predictions, however, are not new to 
book-building models of IPO pricing. Table 1 summarizes these predictions in comparison with 
those from Benveniste and Spindt (1989), the most prominent book-building model, and from 
Derrien (2005), the closely comparable model.  
                                                          
7 An upward adjustment of ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
−−
LH
LH
b
LH
δδ
δδ
4
 is smaller than a full-adjustment of ( )
b
LH
4
− .  
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The model of Benveniste and Spindt (1989) implies a positive association between initial 
returns and price updates for hot IPOs, and this implication finds strong empirical support. On 
the other hand, their model is less clear for cold IPOs about this association. In fact, if 
underpricing is also used to compensate informed investors for providing unfavorable 
information, the offer price needs to be adjusted downwards and excessively in order to leave 
money on the table. An excessive negative adjustment would thus cause a negative association 
between a positive initial return and a negative price adjustment.  
Our model’s predictions in this table are the same as those from Derrien’s investor-
sentiment model of IPO pricing. This is not surprising because the notion of investor sentiment 
is necessarily associated with abnormally high or low short-term demand. However, the 
economic rationale in Derrien is conceptually different, which requires irrational behavior of 
the uninformed investors who would otherwise face an adverse-selection problem. Further 
differences arise between the two models regarding the long-term effect. For hot IPOs, while 
both models predict a short-term positive abnormal return, in the long run this return disappears 
in our model but turns negative in Derrien. And for cold IPOs, which earn zero initial return in 
both models, Derrien predicts fair pricing while our model predicts a discount on the 
fundamental value. Therefore, the two models have quite different implications for IPO returns 
in the short run (which is associated with the early aftermarket uncertainty) and in the long run 
(which is associated with the fundamental value). In the next subsection, we discuss such 
differences by decomposing IPO initial return to separate the short-term effect and the long-
term effect. 
C.  Decomposition of IPO Initial Return 
We now decompose the initial return into two components: the demand-uncertainty 
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component and the fundamental-discount component which we define below. We denote the 
new issue’s intrinsic value per share as *P , which is initially unknown and is gradually realized 
as aftermarket trading progresses. The initial return (IR) can be decomposed as: 
( ) ( ) FDDU IRIRPPPPPPIR +=−+−=−= 0**101 ,   (13) 
where subscript DU denotes demand uncertainty and subscript FD denotes fundamental 
discount. The first component represents the premium in the first-day price over the shares’ 
fundamental value. This component reflects the uncertainty effect of the volatile short-term 
demand, which we refer to as the demand-uncertainty component of IPO initial return. The 
second component represents the discount of the shares’ fundamental value at the offer price, 
which we refer to as the fundamental-discount component of IPO initial return. We also call it 
the underpricing component. 
All book-building-based models of IPO pricing have explicit or implicit implications for 
these two components and their relations with the price update. To derive such implications of 
our model, we obtain the intrinsic value that is consistent with the underwriter’s posterior 
probabilities: 
    ( ) ( )( )⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−−
−
=
.1y probabilitwith 
,y probabilitwith 
,
0
0
0
*
PM
PM
PM
aH
b
NL
aH
b
NH
NaP
δ
δ
  (14) 
Therefore, ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0* 1 PaHLHLbPE PM −−+= δ . Noting that bNP 00 =  and 
0
0
1 Pb
a
b
NaP PMPM −=−=  and using Proposition 1, we obtain the following further results for 
the two initial-return components and their relations with the price update: 
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Proposition 2:  The expected initial-return components are a function of the pre-market 
demand and are determined as follows: 
    ( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )( )⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
=−−
−−−
=+
−
=−=
, If
2
1
, If
*
1
La
b
LH
Ha
b
LH
PEPIRE
PMLH
H
PMLH
L
DU
δδ
δ
δδ
δ
   (15) 
    ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=−−
−−
=
=−=
, If
2
1
, If0
0
*
La
b
LH
Ha
PPEIRE
PMLH
H
PM
FD
δδ
δ   (16) 
which can be further expressed as their relations with the price update:  
  ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
=−−−
−
=−+=
−
−
, If
2
14
, If
10
10
LaPPa
HaPP
IRE
PMLH
H
PMLH
L
DU
δδ
δδ
δ
  (17)  
 ( ) ( )( )( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=−−−
−−
=
=
− . If2
14
, If0
10 LaPP
Ha
IRE
PMLH
H
PM
FD
δδ
δ   (18) 
This is a key result of our model that contains rich testable implications and distinguishes 
our model from various previous models. One immediate observation is the meaning of 
underpricing … 
A restatement of Proposition 2 gives the following testable predictions for the decomposed 
IPO initial returns: 
Prediction 4.  (i) For hot IPOs, the initial return exclusively comes from the demand-
uncertainty component: this component is positive and positively associated with price update, 
while the fundamental-discount component is zero, unassociated with price update. (ii) For 
cold IPOs, the two components are perfectly offsetting (so there is zero initial return): the 
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demand-uncertainty component is negative and positively associated with price update, while 
the fundamental-discount component is positive and negatively associated with price update. 
This is a unique prediction that differentiates our model from all previous models. Table 2 
summarizes the predicted signs for decomposed IPO initial returns and their relations with 
price updates in contrast to the predictions from Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Derrien 
(2005).  
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) do not consider aftermarket mispricing so their predictions 
of underpricing apply to the fundamental-discount component. For hot IPOs, Benveniste and 
Spindt predict a positive initial return and a positive link between the initial return and price 
update; in our model, this component is zero while the other component determines a positive 
initial return and a positive link between the initial return and price update. For cold IPOs, the 
predictions from Benveniste and Spindt are less clear, while our model predicts the two 
components to be perfectly offsetting and to have opposite relations with price updates (which 
we further discuss below). 
The comparison between Derrien (2005) and our model is particularly interesting because 
both models have direct implications for the initial return components. The investor-sentiment 
component in Derrien corresponds to the demand-uncertainty component in our model. As 
shown in Table 2, the two models have sharply contrasted predictions for the decomposed 
initial returns for both hot and cold IPOs. For hot IPOs, although the two models have the same 
predictions for the demand-uncertainty component, their predictions for the fundamental-
discount component are different: while Derrien predicts the fundamental-discount component 
to be negative (due to overpricing relative to the fair value) and to be increasing in the price 
update, our model predicts this component to be zero and thus unassociated with the price 
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update. In particular, the two models have sharply contrasted predictions for cold IPOs. With 
cold IPOs being fairly priced, Derrien predicts both initial return components to be zero and 
thus unrelated to price revision. On the other hand, cold IPOs are underpriced in our model, 
which dictates a positive fundamental-discount component and a corresponding offsetting 
demand-uncertainty component, and accordingly the two components change in opposite 
directions with the price update.  
The predictions for the decomposed IPO initial returns are the key results that distinguish 
our model from and previous ones. Our empirical test shall focus on these predictions.   
III.  Data 
We collect data on IPOs for the period of 1991-2006 from the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) New Issues Database. Following previous studies, we eliminate ADRs, closed-end 
funds, REITs, spin-offs, and unit issues by only choosing common stocks with the IPO flag 
equal to one. To ensure that our results are not disproportionally affected by very small issuers, 
we exclude from the sample any IPOs with an offer price less than $5 per share (see, e.g., 
Lowry and Schwert, 2004; Bradley and Jordan, 2002). For each IPO, we collect information on 
the offer date, preliminary filing offer price range, proceeds, SIC code, and VC backing. We 
also collect the financial statement information such as total sales, EBITDA (earnings before 
interest, tax, depreciation and amortization) and earnings from Compustat. Since the accounting 
information of IPO firms for the fiscal year prior to IPO is very limited with Compustat and we 
further require IPO firms to have positive EBITDA, our final sample size is reduced to 3411. 
To describe underwriter reputation, we follow Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark 
and Singh (1998) to identify the lead underwriter from SDC and assign a rank in a 10-point 
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scale based on the Loughran and Ritter (2002) classification. For IPOs with more than one 
leading manager, the average rank of all leading underwriters is used.  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the sample. On average, IPOs are sold at $13.65 
per share and raise capital of $47 million. After book building, the average offer price is 
updated upwards by about 1.1%. The mean and median initial returns are 18.81% and 7.58%, 
respectively, with the distribution displaying significant positive skewness as in Loughran and 
Ritter (2004). Of all issuing firms, 36% receive funding from venture capitalists, 31.9% of our 
sample is technology and internet stocks as defined by SIC codes in Loughran and Ritter 
(2004), and about two thirds of all IPOs are listed on NASDAQ. 
IV.  Empirical Analysis 
(The writing of this section is very preliminary, but the results are carefully reported in 
Tables 3-9) The first and key step in our test is to estimate the intrinsic or fair value of an IPO 
and use it to decompose the initial return. We perform initial-return decomposition in two 
alternative approaches. In the first approach, we use comparable industry peers’ price 
multiplies to estimate the intrinsic value; and in the second approach, we use the secondary-
market price of the IPO over time (on which the effect of investor sentiment diminishes over 
time) as a proxy for the intrinsic value. As we will show, the two approaches give highly 
consistent results that support our model’s predictions.  
Our first approach is similar to Bhojraj and Lee (2002) and Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2004). We first choose matching firms from the same industry based on the 48-industry 
classification of Fama and French (1997). Firms within the same industry are likely to have 
similar operating and business nature and face similar market-wide and firm-specific risks. 
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More specifically, to select an appropriate matching firm, we first look at all firms in the 
Compustat active and research files for the fiscal year prior to the IPO year. For each IPO, we 
identify all potential matching firms that are in the same industry as the IPO firm and were 
listed at least three years earlier. We then classify the matching firms into three groups base on 
past sales, and further divide each sales group into two groups based on the EBITDA profit 
margin (which is defined as EBITDA/Sales).8 With IPO firms’ pre-IPO sales and profit margin 
information, we match each IPO firm to its appropriate matching portfolio: from all matching 
firms in the portfolio, we choose the one with the closest sales to the IPO firm. In this way, the 
matching by sales assures that the matching firms have similar size to the IPO firms while the 
operating profitability being reasonably controlled. In untabulated results, we compare the 
characteristics of IPO firms and their matching counterparts by performing non-parametric 
mean and median tests on the difference between them in terms of total asset, sales, EBITDA 
and net incomes. We find no difference in firm fundaments between the IPO firms and their 
matching firms at the conventional level. 
To further ensure robustness of our results, we use three price multiplies, which are the 
price-to-earning ratio (P/E), the price-to-EBITDA ratio (P/EBITDA), and the price-to-sales 
ratio (P/S), and obtain the following alternative intrinsic value estimates: 
     
)(*)(
)(*)(Pr*)(*
MatchEarningsIPOShares
MatchSharesMatchiceIPOEarningsP =  
     
)(*)(
)(*)(Pr*)(*
MatchEBITDAIPOShares
MatchSharesMatchiceIPOEBITDAP =  
     
)(*)(
)(*)(Pr*)(*
MatchSalesIPOShares
MatchSharesMatchiceIPOSalesP =  
                                                          
8 When there are not enough firms for an industry, we change to 2×2 classifications. 
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We obtain the price and number of shares outstanding data of matching firms on the day 
when the matched IPO firm went public. All the accounting information of IPO and matching 
firms are from the fiscal year prior to the IPO. We calculate the demand-uncertainty component 
of IPO initial return as the percentage difference between the first-trading day closing price and 
the estimated intrinsic value of the IPO, and calculate the fundamental-discount component as 
the percentage difference between the estimated intrinsic value and the final offer price.  
Table 4 reports the summary statistics of IPO initial returns and the two components. 
Because the information content in small price updates is often more difficult to interpret and 
for the purpose of obtaining contrasted results for hot and cold IPOs, we remove IPOs with 
price update between -5% and 5%. Therefore, we consider an IPO as hot if the price update is 
above 5% and an IPO as cold if the price update is below -5%.9 This classification leaves us 
1240 hot IPOs and 1232 cold IPOs from the P/EBIDTA multiple valuation, and 1261 hot IPOs 
and 1285 cold IPOs from the P/Sales multiple valuation. Since many IPOs have negative 
earnings before the IPO, the number of observation from the P/Earning multiple valuation is 
further reduced to 1025 hot IPOs and 1016 cold IPOs.  
Consistent with the predictions reported in Table 2 (Panel A), for hot IPOs, the initial return 
mostly comes from the demand-uncertainty component. The mean and median of this 
component is positive in all three panels, ranging from 15.43% to 72.14%. This observation 
implies that due to excess short-term demand relative to the firm’s fundamentals, investors are 
willing to pay much higher prices than the expected intrinsic value. On the other hand, the 
fundamental-discount component of hot IPOs is mixed, depending on the price multiple 
chosen. This component has a positive mean and median with the P/Earnings multiple 
                                                          
9 Our main results are qualitatively similar if we use other thresholds for hot and cold IPOs classification. 
 22
valuation, but a positive mean together with a negative median with the P/EBIDTA and P/Sales 
valuation.  
For cold IPOs, our model predicts the fundamental-discount component to be positive and 
the demand-uncertainty component to be negative, with the two perfectly offsetting. This 
prediction finds very strong support in Table 4. The fundamental-discount component is 
positive in all three panels, with the three mean numbers averaged at 41.13% and the three 
median numbers averaged at 10.42%. On the other hand and as expected, the numbers for the 
demand-uncertainty component are all negative, each with a magnitude very close to its 
fundamental-discount counterpart. There numbers suggest strongly that, in a cold IPO, after 
leaning the unexpected low demand from book building, the underwriters have to place a 
significant discount relative to the intrinsic value to sell the IPO in the pre-market.  
Before conducting our major tests for decomposed initial returns, we run regressions of 
(total) IPO initial return on the price update. Such regressions present the test for our model’s 
predictions for the initial return-price update relationship (Table 1), which also replicate 
previous studies regarding this relationship. The first regression in Table 5 presents the 
regression result for the whole sample. Consistent with Hanley (1993) and others (e.g. 
Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Liungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002), the estimated coefficient on price 
update is 0.713 and is significant at the 1% level. When the regression is run for hot IPOs and 
cold IPOs separately, the coefficient changes dramatically. For hot IPOs, the coefficient is 
0.687 and remains statistically highly significant; for cold IPOs, however, the coefficient 
reduces to as low as -0.011 and becomes statistically insignificant.  
While this asymmetric initial return-price update relation between hot and cold IPOs is well 
documented in previous studies, our interpretation is completely different. ... 
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The coefficients on the control variables are largely in line with the existing literature. 
Consistent with Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Chemmanur and Krishnan (2007), the 
coefficient on top-underwriter dummy is significantly positive for the whole sample. In the 
subsample regressions, separating hot and cold IPOs, however, this coefficient becomes 
statistically insignificant. In addition to reduced sample size, one possible reason for this 
insignificant coefficient is that the way we classify hot and cold IPOs is related to the 
underwriter ranking dummy. For example, when more reputed underwriters have better sales 
forces and networks than others, such writers, who are associated with higher underwriting 
rankings, are more likely to attract higher than expected demand. The coefficients on VC 
dummy are positive and significant for the regressions for hot IPOs, which is consistent with 
more recent studies such as Hamao, Packer and Ritter (2000), Brav and Gompers (2002), and 
Bradley and Jordan (2002), who find that underpricing is in fact more severe among VC-
backed firms during the 1990s.  
Table 6 presents our major results, the test for decomposed initial returns (Prediction 4). We 
run regressions of the two initial-return components on the price update, controlling for issuer, 
underwriter, and market characteristics as in Table 5. The three panels report the regressions for 
the return components decomposed based on new-issue-valuation using the P/Earnings, 
P/EBITDA, and P/Sales ratio, respectively, separating hot IPOs and cold IPOs. The parameter 
for the price update is our main concern. The coefficient estimate for this parameter is 
consistent with our model’s predictions in all regressions. For hot IPOs, in all three panels, the 
coefficient on the price update is positive and statistically significant in the regression of the 
demand-uncertainty component while it is statistically not different from zero in the regression 
of the fundamental-discount component. Consistent with the model’s predictions, these 
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estimates show that the well-documented positive association of IPO initial return with price 
revision in a hot IPO is purely a demand-uncertainty effect. This effect is also significant 
economically. With the estimated coefficient ranging from 0.445 to 0.598, the estimates 
indicate a half-percentage point increase of the initial return for every one percentage point 
increase in the price update. On the other hand, the finding that the fundamental-discount 
component does not respond to the price adjustment in a hot IPO does not support the notion 
that the underwriter takes an advantage of market sentiment to overprice the IPO or uses 
underpricing as a compensation scheme for informed investors. 
The results for cold IPOs are particularly interesting. The usual perception is that cold IPOs 
earn negligible initial returns and such returns are not meaningfully associated with price 
adjustments, so cold IPOs are uninformative and uninteresting. In contrast to this perception, 
the estimates in Table 6 suggest a significantly negative effect of price update on the 
fundamental-discount component. This effect is particularly strong in Panels A and B, which 
indicates a roughly one-for-one change, in percentage-point terms, in the fundamental-discount 
component for a price update. This result highlights our model’s prediction that in a cold IPO, 
the abnormally low demand pushes the offer price below the fair value, and as a result of the 
binding demand, every dollar of change in the price is translated into an opposite change in the 
fundamental discount or underpricing. Such forced underpricing is caused directly by the 
abnormally low demand that, on the other hand, determines the demand-uncertainty component 
in the opposite direction. Consistent with this mechanism, in the three regressions for the 
demand-uncertainty component, the coefficient on the price update is positive and has a 
magnitude closely comparable with the counterpart in the regressions for the fundamental-
discount component. 
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Many of our estimated coefficients for the control variables are also very interesting. For 
instance, the coefficients on the VC dummy variable are positive in the regressions for the 
demand-uncertainty component, while they are negative in the regressions for the fundamental-
discount component. This result seems to imply that venture capital backing helps generate 
high short-term demand and reduce underpricing. For IPOs conducted during the bubble 
period, the demand-uncertainty component returns are higher while the fundamental-discount 
component return is lower. This finding is reasonable as in bubble period, investor sentiment 
pushes the short-term demand above the expected long-term demand, and the pressure for the 
underwriter to underprice the new issue is low. The coefficients for the dummy variables for 
high tech and NASDAQ are also associated with the similar pattern: They are mostly positive 
with the demand-uncertainty component and mostly negatively with the fundamental-discount 
component.  
As an alternative test for our model’s main predictions (Prediction 4), we use the new 
stock’s aftermarket prices over time as a proxy for the fair value and use them to decompose 
initial returns. It should be noted that the secondary prices can be a very noise measure of the 
intrinsic value, of which the problem is perhaps most serious with early aftermarket prices. 
However, our major interest in this test is in the over time pattern of the estimation as we will 
choose many aftermarket prices of different post-IPO time periods. For this test, we exclude 
dividend-paying IPOs from the sample, as dividends reduce the share price that consequently 
would underestimate the fair value at the IPO. This exclusion leaves us with 975 hot IPOs and 
1099 cold IPOs.   
Tables 7 presents the mean values of decomposed initial returns, separately, for hot and 
cold IPOs. We use a series of IPO aftermarket prices as the proxy for the fair value, and use 
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each of these proxies to decompose the initial return. When the first-trading day closing price, 
P1, is used as the proxy (which is when we consider the immediate aftermarket price to be the 
fair price), we assume away short-term demand uncertainty so that, by construction, the 
demand-uncertainty component is zero and the fundamental-discount component equals total 
initial return. The predicted signs for the fundamental-discount component in this case are the 
same as those for total initial return (as summarized in Table 1). The first row of Table 7 
summarizes the predicted signs for the two components when P1 is used as the fair value. On 
the other hand, in the ideal case when the long-term share price, P∞, approaches the intrinsic 
value (which is when the demand uncertainty is gradually resolved in aftermarket trading so the 
market demand approaches the long-term demand), the decomposed initial returns based on P∞ 
approach the theoretically defined components. Therefore, the predicted signs for the initial-
return components in this case approach our model’s predictions (Table 2), which we 
summarize in the last row of Table 7. In summary, as the post-IPO time period of the 
aftermarket price increases over time, we expect the decomposed initial-return components to 
be initially consistent with the predicted signs given in the first row in Table 7, and then change 
over time and toward the predicted signs given in the last row.  
As shown in Table 7, the summarized means of the decomposed initial returns and their 
trends over time are consistent with our model’s predications. For hot IPOs, the initial return 
starts as a fundamental-discount component and is as high as 36.12%. As the excessively high 
demand for hot IPOs diminishes over time, this component declines and the demand-
uncertainty component emerges. In about one year of aftermarket trading, the initial 
fundamental-discount component essentially disappears and the fundamental-discount 
component increases to as high as 37.75%. The statistics for cold IPOs are not as strong as that 
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for hot IPOs, but the trends are also consistent with our predictions. Cold IPOs show an initially 
modest fundamental-discount component, which increases over time as the uncertainty in 
aftermarket demand diminishes. At the same time, the demand-uncertainty component is 
initially zero and becomes negative in about 30 days of aftermarket trading.  
Two important points are worth noting about these statistics. First, because many factors 
other than demand uncertainty may play a role in IPO pricing, as numerous existing studies 
indicate, the statistics for the fundamental-discount component in this table may either 
understate or overstate the degree of underpricing. Therefore, it is the trend shown in the 
statistics that is more relevant to our model’s predictions. Second, to avoid introducing noise or 
any systematic bias, we do not discount aftermarket prices to obtain the IPO fair value. This 
strategy tends to weaken the demand-uncertainty component and strengthen the fundamental-
discount component in longer terms. 
In Table 8, we report the regressions for the two return components using the aftermarket 
prices as the proxy for IPO fair value, controlling for the issuer, underwriter, and market 
variables as in Tables 5 and 6. To save space, for each regression, we only report the estimated 
coefficient on the price update and its White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics. 
The trends of the coefficients are highly consistent with our predictions (which, as in Table 7, 
are also shown in the first and last rows in the table). For hot IPOs, there is initially a strong 
positive association between the fundamental-discount component and the price update, and 
this association declines over time and becomes insignificant after about 100 trading days. On 
the other hand, for the demand-uncertainty component, there is initially no relation between 
this component and the price update, but a positive relation emerges after about 30 trading days 
and the relation continues to increase over time. Consistent with our findings reported in Table 
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6, this result shows that the widely observed positive relation between initial returns and price 
updates for hot IPOs are essentially a demand-uncertainty effect. This effect emerges as an 
underpricing effect in the short-run, but it does not persist in the long run. 
For cold IPOs, within the first 200 trading days, the coefficients show no relationship 
between either component of the initial return and the price update. After about 300 trading 
days, the fundamental-discount component becomes negatively associated with the price 
update while the demand-uncertainty component becomes positively associated with the price 
update. As the two coefficients (for the two components, respectively) show, the two effects are 
significant both statistically and economically. And the two effects are substantially offsetting 
to each other: While the two coefficients are with different signs, their magnitudes are closely 
comparable.  
Our model also has a strong implication for the long-run performance of IPOs. It is well-
known that IPO stocks underperform their matching firms. Ritter (1991) finds issuing firms 
during 1975-1984 substantially underperformed their matching firms over the three-year 
periods after their IPOs. On the other hand, Brav and Gompers (1997) and Brav, Geczy and 
Gompers (2000) show that if one takes into consideration that IPO firms are typically small and 
high-growth companies, IPO firms appear to perform no worse than similar firms. Our model 
contributes to this debate by distinguishing between hot and cold IPOs. Because of demand 
uncertainty, in the early aftermarket, the price of a hot IPO is expected to be higher than the 
intrinsic value while the price of a cold IPO is expected to be lower than the intrinsic value. 
Therefore, our model predicts post-IPO underperformance of hot IPOs and post-IPO 
overperformance of cold IPOs.  
 To test for this prediction, we further examine the performance of IPO stocks within the 
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first 12 months. We focus on the one-year window because the results in Tables 7 and 8 
suggest that demand uncertainty is likely to be resolved in one year. To evaluate IPO long-run 
performance, we obtain IPO cumulative average adjusted return (CAR) calculated with 
monthly rebalancing. The adjusted return is computed using two different benchmarks 
alternatively: the CRSP value-weighted index return and the return of a matching firm. Daily 
stock return information is collected from the CRSP daily stock files, from which we exclude 
IPO first-trading-day returns. For each IPO firm, we choose the matching firm which has the 
same 2-digit SIC code, went public at least three years earlier, and has the closest size and 
book-to-market ratio. Table 9 presents the result for this examination, where we report the CAR 
for 3, 6, 9 and 12 months periods, respectively, for hot and cold IPOs. Over the three-months 
period, hot IPOs under-perform their benchmark by 4.33% (1.46% ) using style-adjusted 
(index-adjusted) cumulative average return, while cold IPOs over-perform their benchmark by 
4.55% (3.76%) using style-adjusted (index-adjusted) cumulative average return. The 
underperformance of hot IPOs persists and over the 12 months period, hot IPOs under-perform 
their benchmark by 9.96% (10.70%) using style-adjusted (index-adjusted) cumulative average 
return. However, the overperformance of cold IPOs diminishes over time, and becomes 
insignificant after six months.  
The sharp difference in post-IPO performance between hot and cold IPOs is consistent with 
our model’s prediction, although the performance of cold IPOs beyond six months is mixed. As 
suggested by previous studies, the long-run performance of newly listed firms is likely to be 
affected by various factors and hence displays complex regularities. It is hence not surprising 
that demand uncertainty alone cannot ideally account for the complex long-run performance 
regularities. 
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V.  Conclusion 
The role of market learning in the demand for new issues has largely been ignored in the 
literature of IPO pricing. Previous models unanimously ignore this role and hence, in those 
models, the intrinsic value is always immediately realized in aftermarket trading (unless the 
market is driven by irrational investors). Departing from this literature, in this paper we 
examine IPO pricing by allowing the early-market demand to deviate from its stabilized long-
term demand. We propose a simple model to formalize the effect of abnormal early-market 
demand on IPO pricing. 
We show that in the presence of the new-issue uncertainty, the decision of the underwriter, 
a Bayesian learner who faces uninformed rational investors, displays properties that are 
consistent with a variety of IPO regularities. Some of these regularities are well documented in 
the empirical literature, which involve IPO initial return, partial price update, and asymmetric 
effects between hot and cold IPOs. By decomposing the initial return into the demand-
uncertainty component and the fundamental-discount component, our model predicts further 
properties of IPOs that show deeper pricing mechanisms unexplored in previous studies. We 
empirically test these properties and provide evidence that is highly consistent with the model’s 
predictions. 
However, it is important to note that our results by no means undermine the roles of other 
important factors in IPO pricing such as asymmetric information, strategic pricing and 
allocation, and market timing. Although we have highlighted the role of abnormal short-term 
demand associated with market learning, this role should be limited. For instance, without the 
presence of other factors, market learning alone would predict long-run over-performance of 
IPOs, because excessive uncertainty arising from market learning pushes the price down. This 
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prediction is apparently inconsistent with the abundant evidence on the long-run performance 
of IPOs. 
Appendix A.  Proof of Proposition 1 
For the underwriter’s problem,  
00, 00
PNMax
NP
    s.t.    00 bPaN PM −≤ ;   ( ) ( )[ ]b NaHLaHHP PMPM 00 1 −−+≤ δδ , 
the Lagrangian function is: 
   ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]00200100 1 bPNaHLaHHNbPaPNL PMPMPM −−−++−−+= δδλλ , 
where 1λ  and 2λ  are the multipliers for the two constraints, respectively. We have the 
following first-order derivatives: 
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At the optimum, there must be  0
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L  and 0=∂
∂
N
L , which requires  
          0bPN = .      (A5) 
Further, the sales and valuation constraints cannot simultaneously be binding, because 
otherwise ( ) ( )( )PMPMPM aHLaHHa δδ −+= 1  which never holds. On the other hand, the two 
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constraints cannot simultaneously be unbinding, because otherwise 0
0
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∂
P
L  and 0>∂
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L  which 
violate the necessary conditions. Therefore, in the solution, one constraint must be binding and 
the other must be unbinding.  
We now discuss the solution for HaPM =  and LaPM =  separately. For HPM aa = , the 
posterior probability is ( ) LH HPM HaH δδ δδ +== . We start with the binding valuation 
constraint and obtain:  
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With this solution, we can verify that the sales constraint  
( )
LH
LLHL
δδ
δ
λ +
−=∂
∂
1
 
is positive and thus unbinding. Therefore, Eq. (A6) gives the solution for HaPM = . 
For LaPM = , the posterior probability becomes ( ) LH HPM LaH δδ δδ −− −== 2 1  . We start with 
the binding sales constraint and obtain:  
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20
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With this solution, we can verify that the valuation constraint  
        ( )( )LH HLHL δδ δλ −− −−=∂∂ 2 12  
is positive and thus unbinding. Therefore, (A7) must be the solution for LaPM = .  ? 
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Table 1. Theoretical Predictions for Initial Return and its Relation with Price Update 
 
This table summarizes testable predictions of our model for IPO initial return and its relation with IPO price update in comparison with two representative book-
building models of IPO pricing (Benveniste and Spindt (1989); Derrien (2005)). In these predictions, we define an IPO as “hot” if the price update is positive 
and an IPO as “cold” if the price update is negative.  
 
 
 
Price update Initial return 
Relation between initial 
return and price update 
 
 
Theory 
 
 
Models 
Hot IPOs Cold IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs 
Information revelation Benveniste and Spindt (1989) Partial adjustment Excessive adjustment + ? + ? 
Investor sentiment Derrien (2005) Partial adjustment Full adjustment + 0 + 0 
Demand uncertainty This paper Partial adjustment Full adjustment + 0 + 0 
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Table 2.   Theoretical Predictions for Decomposed Initial Return and their Relations with Price Update 
 
This table summarizes testable predictions of our model for decomposed IPO initial returns and their relations with IPO price update in comparison with two 
representative book-building models of IPO pricing (Benveniste and Spindt (1989); Derrien (2005)). We decompose an IPO’s initial return as follows: 
                                             ( ) ( ) FDDU IRIRPPPPPPIR +=−+−=−= 0**101)(Return Initial , 
where P* is the IPO’s intrinsic value that is consistent with the stabilized long-term market demand for the stock. We call the first component, IRDU, the 
demand-uncertainty component and the second component, IRFD, the fundamental-discount component. In these predictions, we define an IPO as “hot” if the 
price update is positive and an IPO as “cold” if the price update is negative. 
 
 
 
Demand-uncertainty component     ( IRDU ) Fundamental-discount component  (IRFD )  
Theory 
 
Model Hot IPOs Cold IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs 
A. Initial-return components 
Information revelation Benveniste and Spindt (1989) NA NA + ? 
Investor sentiment Derrien (2005) + 0 − 0 
Demand uncertainty This paper + − 0 + 
B. Relations between initial-return components and price update 
Information revelation Benveniste and Spindt (1989) NA NA + ? 
Investor sentiment Derrien (2005) + 0 − 0 
Demand uncertainty This paper + + 0 − 
 39
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
Our IPO sample is obtained from the SDC database. We include all IPOs conducted during the period of 1991-2006 with the final offer price above $5. IPO 
initial return is the percentage difference between the first-trading day closing price and the final offer price. IPO price update is the percentage change from the 
midpoint of the filing low and high initial offer prices to the final offer price. VC dummy (which is equal to one if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists, and 
equal to zero otherwise), top-underwriter dummy (which, is equal to one if the managing underwriter has a ranking of eight or above out of ten, and equal to 
zero otherwise), tech dummy (which is equal to one if the firm is a high-technology company, and zero otherwise), bubble dummy (which is equal to one if the 
IPO is in 1999 or 2000, and zero otherwise), and the NASDAQ dummy for stocks listed on NASDAQ. 
 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard deviation Observation 
Offer Price 13.653 13.000 5 97 6.120 3411 
Initial return (%) 18.812 7.576 -75.789 525.00 39.325 3411 
Price update(%) 1.126 0 -98.419 400 23.809 3411 
Log (Proceeds) 3.852 3.766 -1.609 9.286 1.206 3411 
Top underwriter dummy 0.592 1 0 1 0.492 3411 
VC dummy 0.361 0 0 1 0.480 3411 
Tech dummy 0.319 0 0 1 0.466 3411 
Bubble dummy 0.127 0 0 1 0.334 3411 
NASDAQ dummy 0.676 1 0 1 0.468 3411 
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Table 4:  Statistics for Decomposed IPO Initial Returns    
 
This table reports the summary statistics for decomposed of IPO initial return. We decompose an IPO’s initial return as follows: 
                                          ( ) ( ) FDDU IRIRPPPPPPIR +=−+−=−= 0**101)(Return Initial , 
where P* is the estimated fair value using a price multiple of non-IPO industry peers. We call the first component, IRDU, the demand-uncertainty component and 
the second component, IRFD, the fundamental-discount component. We calculate the demand-uncertainty component as the percentage difference between the 
first-trading day closing price and the estimated intrinsic value of the new stock, and calculate the fundamental-discount component as the percentage difference 
between the new stock’s estimated fair value and the final offer price. We compute IPO fair value using three price multiples of matching non-IPO industry 
peers, alternatively, which are the price-to-EBITDA ratio, the price-to-sales ratio, and the price-to-earnings ratio. Industry groupings are based on the 48 
industries defined in Fama and French (1997). We define an IPO as “hot” if the price update is positive and greater than 5%, and an IPO as “cold” if the price 
update is negative and lower than -5%. We report the summary statistics for each of the price-multiple based matching methods. 
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Initial return  
(IR) 
Demand-uncertainty component of initial 
return  ( IRDU  ) 
Fundamental-discount component of initial 
return  (IRFD  ) 
 
 
All IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs All IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs All IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs 
 
A.   Matched by P/Earnings 
Mean 19.322 39.169 4.789 -25.192 15.432 -54.011 44.514 23.736 58.800 
Median 7.895 22.024 1.562 -26.393 54.168 -8.475 15.169 32.242 4.292 
Minimum -33.077 -30.100 -33.077 -563.067 -552.453 -563.067 -93.472 -93.472 -93.472 
Maximum 525.000 525.000 107.143 602.166 602.166 168.472 549.000 549.000 549.000 
Standard deviation 39.563 55.668 12.858 172.353 163.076 173.839 164.201 148.416 173.127 
Observation 2713 1025 1016 2713 1025 1016 2713 1025 1016 
 
B.  Matched by P/EBIDTA 
Mean 19.390 39.134 5.065 -3.392 34.111 -31.353 22.782 5.023 36.418 
Median 7.895 22.448 1.653 34.731 63.110 -14.393 -22.416 -38.880 10.555 
Minimum -53.030 -30.100 -33.077 -458.035 -440.783 -453.393 -127.330 -127.330 -127.330 
Maximum 525.000 525.000 107.143 634.830 634.830 178.025 435.536 435.535 435.536 
Standard deviation 39.946 56.231 13.249 148.353 145.711 147.506 139.724 131.281 146.353 
Observation 3279 1240 1232 3279 1240 1232 5379 1240 1232 
 
C.  Matched by P/Sales 
Mean 18.813 38.675 4.949 -0.189 42.269 -23.213 19.001 -3.594 28.161 
Median 7.576 22.115 1.559 40.753 72.137 -21.389 -29.946 -48.797 16.427 
Minimum -75.789 -30.100 -33.077 -400.256 -386.037 -400.256 -92.855 -92.856 -92.856 
Maximum 525.000 525.000 107.143 609.011 509.011 171.275 381.198 381.198 381.198 
Standard deviation 39.325 55.882 13.079 138.091 135.539 129.228 127.706 117.016 127.395 
Observation 3411 1261 1286 3411 1261 1286 3411 1261 1286 
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Table 5.  Regressions for IPO Initial Returns    
 
This table reports the regression results for IPO initial return on the price update. The price update is the 
percentage change from the midpoint of the filing low and high initial offer prices to the final offer price. We 
include the following control variables: The logarithm of IPO proceeds, VC dummy (which is equal to one if the 
IPO is backed by venture capitalists, and equal to zero otherwise), top-underwriter dummy (which, is equal to 
one if the managing underwriter has a ranking of eight or above out of ten, and equal to zero otherwise), tech 
dummy (which is equal to one if the firm is a high-technology company, and zero otherwise), bubble dummy 
(which is equal to one if the IPO is in 1999 or 2000, and zero otherwise), and the NASDAQ dummy for stocks 
listed on NASDAQ. White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistic is reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 Initial return 
 
All IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs 
Price update 
 
0.713*** 
(6.85) 
0.687*** 
(3.22) 
-0.011 
(-0.30) 
log (Proceeds) 
 
-1.327** 
(-2.23) 
1.516 
(1.00) 
-1.165*** 
(-2.61) 
Top-underwriter dummy 
 
2.046* 
(1.81) 
3.849 
(1.40) 
-0.564 
(-0.68) 
VC dummy 
 
6.764*** 
(5.47) 
11.110*** 
(4.02) 
-0.282 
(-0.33) 
Tech dummy 
 
6.018*** 
(3.99) 
7.296** 
(2.31) 
2.650*** 
(2.59) 
Bubble dummy 
 
34.084*** 
(10.93) 
51.477*** 
(9.72) 
5.982*** 
(2.79) 
NASDAQ dummy 3.240*** 
(2.65) 
9.274*** 
(2.75) 
0.405 
(0.51) 
Intercept 
 
11.032*** 
(3.68) 
-10.038 
(-1.22) 
7.504*** 
(3.51) 
Observation 3411 1261 1286 
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.367 0.041 
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Table 6.  Regressions for Decomposed IPO Initial Returns on Price Update   
 
We decompose an IPO’s initial return as follows: 
        ( ) ( ) FDDU IRIRPPPPPPIR +=−+−=−= 0**101)(Return Initial , 
where P* is the estimated fair value using a price multiple of non-IPO industry peers. IRDU is the demand-
uncertainty component and IRFD is the fundamental-discount component. This table presents the regression 
results from the IPO initial-return components on IPO price update. The price update is the percentage change 
from the midpoint of the filing low and high initial offer prices to the final offer price. Control variables used in 
the regressions include the following: The logarithm of IPO proceeds, VC dummy (which is equal to one if the 
IPO is backed by venture capitalists, and equal to zero otherwise), top-underwriter dummy (which, is equal to 
one if the managing underwriter has a ranking of eight or above out of ten, and equal to zero otherwise), tech 
dummy (which is equal to one if the firm is a high-technology company, and zero otherwise), bubble dummy 
(which is equal to one if the IPO is in 1999 or 2000, and zero otherwise), and the NASDAQ dummy for stocks 
listed on NASDAQ. The regressions are run separately for hot IPOs (of which the price update is positive and 
more than 5%) and for cold IPOs (of which the price update is negative and lower than -5%). Panel A, B and C 
report the regressions for the decomposed initial-return components based on the estimated fair value from the 
P/E ratio, the P/EBITDA ratio, and the P/sales ratio, respectively. White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent t-
statistic is reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 
Demand-uncertainty component (IRDU)  Fundamental-discount component 
(IRFD) 
 
Hot IPOs Cold IPOs 
 
Hot IPOs Cold IPOs 
 
A.  Match by P/Earnings 
Price update 
 
0.598** 
(2.25) 
1.044** 
(2.16) 
 -0.004 
(-0.02) 
-1.089** 
(-2.26) 
log (Proceeds) 
 
-4.901 
(-0.80) 
-10.843* 
(-1.81) 
 6.809 
(1.15) 
9.875 
(1.66) 
Top-underwriter dummy 
 
16.122 
(1.46) 
28.285** 
(2.30) 
 -11.531 
(-1.09) 
-28.435** 
(-2.33) 
VC dummy 
 
33.356*** 
(3.25) 
18.364 
(1.48) 
 -23.778** 
(-2.42) 
-18.623 
(-1.51) 
Tech dummy 
 
20.385* 
(1.80) 
-22.169 
(-1.61) 
 -14.016 
(-1.34) 
23.815* 
(1.73) 
Bubble dummy 
 
66.884*** 
(5.13) 
55.861*** 
(3.53) 
 -14.330 
(-1.22) 
-51.447*** 
(-3.30) 
NASDAQ dummy 36.225*** 
(2.63) 
25.643* 
(1.94) 
 -25.828** 
(-2.00) 
-24.498* 
(-1.86) 
Intercept 
 
-53.240* 
(-1.68) 
-35.603 
(-1.26) 
 42.935 
(1.43) 
41.250 
(1.47) 
Observation 1025 1016  1025 1016 
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.023  0.031 0.021 
 
B.  Match by P/EBITDA 
Price update 
 
0.445*** 
(2.79) 
1.230*** 
(2.78) 
 0.245 
(1.04) 
-1.243*** 
(-2.83) 
log (Proceeds) 
 
-3.216 
(-0.62) 
-14.176*** 
(-3.06) 
 4.732 
(0.95) 
12.943*** 
(2.80) 
Top-underwriter dummy 
 
-1.397 
(-0.16) 
3.004 
(0.34) 
 5.368 
(0.63) 
-3.612 
(-0.41) 
VC dummy 
 
26.793*** 
(3.22) 
25.124*** 
(2.83) 
 -15.803** 
(-2.01) 
-25.525*** 
(-2.89) 
Tech dummy 
 
32.631*** 
(3.54) 
9.603 
(0.98) 
 -25.373*** 
(-3.03) 
-6.990 
(-0.72) 
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Bubble dummy 
 
62.109*** 
(5.38) 
48.359*** 
(4.06) 
 -10.696 
(-1.02) 
-42.725*** 
(-3.66) 
NASDAQ dummy 27.465*** 
(2.54) 
27.540*** 
(2.72) 
 -17.979* 
(-1.80) 
-27.196*** 
(-2.69) 
Intercept 
 
-21.152 
(-0.85) 
2.517 
(0.12) 
 10.911 
(0.47) 
5.328 
(0.25) 
Observation 1240 1232  1240 1232 
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.046  0.029 0.041 
 
C.  Match by P/Sales 
Price update 
 
0.515*** 
(3.63) 
0.584* 
(1.79) 
 0.172 
(1.09) 
-0.594* 
(-1.85) 
log (Proceeds) 
 
-5.062 
(-1.16) 
-13.384*** 
(-3.24) 
 6.577* 
(1.63) 
12.218*** 
(2.99) 
Top-underwriter dummy 
 
-2.946 
(-0.38) 
5.346 
(0.68) 
 6.796 
(0.92) 
-5.910 
(-0.76) 
VC dummy 
 
36.705*** 
(4.67) 
6.096 
(0.77) 
 -25.594*** 
(-3.51) 
-6.378 
(-0.82) 
Tech dummy 
 
36.299*** 
(4.52) 
24.223*** 
(3.04)  
 -29.004*** 
(-4.09) 
-21.573*** 
(-2.75) 
Bubble dummy 
 
72.852*** 
(7.68) 
54.337*** 
(5.40) 
 -21.375*** 
(-2.66) 
-48.355*** 
(-4.98) 
NASDAQ dummy 28.578*** 
(2.84) 
18.714** 
(2.13) 
 -19.304** 
(-2.08) 
-18.309** 
(-2.10) 
Intercept 
 
-13.741 
(-0.64) 
5.027 
(0.26) 
 3.703 
(0.19) 
2.477 
(0.13) 
Observation 1261 1286  1261 1286 
Adjusted R2 0.178 0.051  0.071 0.043 
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Table 7.  IPO Initial Returns Decomposed Using Aftermarket Prices 
 
This table reports the mean components of IPO initial return decomposed using an aftermarket price, tP , as the proxy for the 
new-issue fair value. Our decomposition approach is the following: 
    ( ) ( ) )()(0101 tIRtIRPPPPPPIR FDDUtt +=−+−=−= , 
where IRDU is the demand-uncertainty component and IRFD is the fundamental-discount component, both as a function of the 
aftermarket price at time t. In the immediate aftermarket, 1PPt =  and, hence, the demand-uncertainty component is zero and 
the fundamental-discount component equals total initial return (as predicted in Table 1). The first row presents the predictions 
for the two components in the immediate aftermarket. In the long term, the aftermarket price approaches the shares’ intrinsic 
value (i.e. *PPt → ), so the decomposed initial returns approach the model’s predictions. The last row presents the predictions 
for the two components in the long run (which are from the third row of Panels A, Table 2).  
 
This table reports the mean components of IPO initial returns. The demand-uncertainty component is the percentage 
difference between the IPO first-trading-day price and the aftermarket price at trading day t. The fundamental-discount 
component is the percentage difference between the aftermarket price at trading day t and the IPO final offer price. The hot 
IPOs are IPOs with price update is more than 5%, and the cold IPOs are IPOs with price update less than -5%. Stocks paying 
dividends are excluded from the sample. 
 
 
  
 
Demand-uncertainty component  
(IRDU ) 
Fundamental-discount component  
( IRFD ) 
 
Day since IPO 
Hot IPOs 
(N=975) 
Cold IPOs 
(N=1099) 
Hot IPOs 
(N=975) 
Cold IPOs 
(N=1099) 
Predicted signs based on the immediate 
aftermarket price: *1 PP =  
0 0 + 0 
Day 1 0 0 36.119 4.368 
Day 2 0.712 0.011 38.360 4.378 
Day 5 0.920 0.047 38.152 4.343 
Day 10 -0.148 -0.007 39.221 4.396 
Day 30 -2.980 -3.064 42.053 7.454 
Day 60 0.681 -6.836 38.391 11.225 
Day 100 4.663 -11.006 34.409 15.396 
Day 150 16.157 -8.774 22.915 13.164 
Day 200 19.197 -5.312 19.875 9.702 
Day 300 32.831 -6.114 4.785 10.784 
Day 400 37.754 -2.445 -0.137 7.114 
Predicted signs based on the long-term 
price: *PP =∞  + − 0 + 
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Table 8.  IPO Initial-Return Components (Decomposed Using Aftermarket Prices) and 
Price Update 
 
This table reports the coefficients on price update in the regressions for IPO initial return components. IPO initial return is 
decomposed, as the following, using an aftermarket price, tP , as the proxy for the new-issue fair value: 
    ( ) ( ) )()(0101 tIRtIRPPPPPPIR FDDUtt +=−+−=−= , 
where IRDU is the demand-uncertainty component and IRFD is the fundamental-discount component, both as a function of the 
aftermarket price at time t. In the immediate aftermarket, 1PPt =  and, hence, the demand-uncertainty component is zero and 
the fundamental-discount component equals total initial return. The relations between initial-return components and price 
update are presented in the last two columns in Table 1. In the long term, the aftermarket price approaches the shares’ 
intrinsic value (i.e. *PPt → ), so the decomposed initial returns approach the model’s predictions. The last row presents the 
predictions for this relation for the two components, respectively, in the long run (which are from the third row of Panels B, 
Table 2).  
 
Regressions are run for hot IPOs and cold IPOs, separately, for the two intial-return components. Hot IPOs are IPOs with the 
price update above 5%, and cold IPOs are IPOs with the price update below -5%. The same control variables as in Tables 5 
and 6 are included in these regressions, for which the coefficients are not reported. White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity 
consistent t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The signs ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
Demand-uncertainty component 
(IRDU ) 
Fundamental-discount component 
 ( IRFD ) 
 
Day since IPO 
Hot IPOs Cold IPOs Hot IPOs Cold IPOs 
Predicted signs based on the immediate 
aftermarket price: *1 PP =  0 0 + 0 
Day 1 0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.871*** 
(3.65) 
0.003 
(0.07) 
Day 2 0.017 
(1.28) 
0.003 
(0.23) 
0.843*** 
(3.52) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
Day 5 -0.084 
(-0.79) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.943*** 
(3.82) 
0.003 
(0.07) 
Day 10 -0.022 
(-0.30) 
0.037 
(0.93) 
0.882*** 
(3.49) 
-0.034 
(-0.59) 
Day 30 0.160* 
(1.91) 
0.025 
(0.36) 
0.699*** 
(3.36) 
-0.022 
(-0.30) 
Day 60 0.436** 
(2.50) 
0.090 
(0.83) 
0.423*** 
(3.16) 
-0.087 
(-0.72) 
Day 100 0.559*** 
(2.69) 
0.108 
(0.53) 
0.300** 
(2.05) 
-0.106 
(-0.49) 
Day 150 0.728** 
(2.57) 
0.030 
(0.15) 
0.132 
(1.06) 
-0.027 
(-0.13) 
Day 200 0.751*** 
(2.60) 
0.182 
(1.06) 
0.108 
(0.82) 
-0.178 
(-1.04) 
Day 300 1.009*** 
(3.10) 
0.575*** 
(2.08) 
-0.096 
(-0.96) 
-0.596** 
(-2.20) 
Day 400 1.014*** 
(2.81) 
0.867*** 
(2.91) 
-0.101 
(-0.78) 
-0.888*** 
(-3.06) 
Predicted signs based on the long-term 
price: *PP =∞  + + 0 − 
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Table 9.  IPO long-run performance 
 
This table reports the long-run performance of hot and cold IPOs. Hot IPOs have a price update above 5% and 
cold IPOs have a price update below -5%. Daily stock returns are obtained from the CRSP daily stock file. CAR 
is an IPO’s cumulative adjusted return. The cumulative return is computed for four trading periods from the first 
trading day to 3, 6, 9 and 12 months, respectively. The style-matching-adjusted CAR is calculated as the 
cumulative monthly average excess return of an IPO over that of its matching stock. Style-matching requires the 
matching stock to be a seasoned stock (that had been listed for at least three years) to have the closest market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratio. The market capitalization and book-to-market ratio are based on the data 
at the time of IPO. The index-adjusted CAR is the cumulative monthly average excess return of an IPO over the 
CRSP value-weighted index return. Following Ritter (1991), we define the corresponding t-statistic as 
CAR*n2/csd, where n is the number of issuing firms trading in each month, and csd=[t*var+2*(t-1)*cov]2, where 
t is the event month, var is the average cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the 
abnormal return series.   
 
Hot IPOs Cold IPOs 
 
 
Time period since IPO Style-matching-
adjusted CAR (%) 
Index-adjusted 
CAR (%) 
Style-matching-
adjusted CAR (%) 
Index-adjusted 
CAR (%) 
3 month -4.326*** 
(-3.45) 
-1.465 
(-1.53) 
4.547*** 
(3.67) 
3.764*** 
(4.13) 
6 month -6.531*** 
(-3.64) 
-4.018*** 
(-2.93) 
1.798 
(1.02) 
2.418* 
(1.86) 
9 month -6.223*** 
(-2.77) 
-5.225*** 
(-3.04) 
-1.358 
(-0.62) 
0.166 
(0.10) 
12 month -9.956*** 
(-3.75) 
-10.699*** 
(-5.28) 
-3.855 
(-1.49) 
-1.696 
(-0.89) 
 
